

Message Text

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2188

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5991

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS,
NOVEMBER 9, 1973 (SALT TWO -350)

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON TTHROW-WEIGHT. THERE WERE WLSO DISCUSSIONS OF EQUALITY, FBS, BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND PERRSONNEL CHANGE IN SOVIET SALT DELEGATION. DISCUSSION AT SOVIET NOV. 7 RECEPTION CENTERED ON MIRVS AND MOBILE ICBMS. END SUMMARY.

2. THROW-WEIGHT. SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-456) SAID THAT HE HAD STUDIED AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S NOVEMBER 6 STATEMENT ON THROW-WEIGHT. HE COULD SAY THAT PERSONALLY HIS REACTION TO THE CONCEPT WAS POSITIVE. HE WANTED NITZE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE VIEWS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION WERE DIFFERENT AND THAT HE WAS NOT, AT THE MOMENT, TALKING ABOUT IST APPLICABILITY TO SPECIFIC LIMITATION, BUT MERELY AS A CONCEPT. HE ALSO WISHED TO REPEAT T HE POINT THAT HE HAD MADEE AT THEIR LAST DISCUSSION THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THROW-WEIGHT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SLBMS AS WELL AS ICBMS AND THAT A SIMILAR FACTOR SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR HEAVY BOMBERS.

3. SHCHUKIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF ONE APPLIED THE CONCEPT OF THROW-WEIGHT TO ICBMS AND SLBMS, WAS IT NOT TRUE THAT ONE

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WOULD NEED NO LIMITATIION ON THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS? EACH SIDE

WOULD THEN BE FREE TO CHOOSE A MIXTURE OF SUCH NUMBERS OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND OF SUCH THROW-WEIGHT FOR THEIR MISSILES AS TO NOT EXCEED, IN THE AGGREGATE, SOME OVERALL LIMITATION ON THE MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT PERMITTED BOTH SIDES. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHCHUKIN MENTIONED, BY WAY OF A THEORETICAL EXAMPLE, A LIMITATION OF A MILLION POUNDS OF THROW-WEIGHT ON EACH SIDE. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONE SIDE MIGHT THEN INCLUDE IN ITS DEPLOYMENT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HEAVY MISSILES AND THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT CHOOSE TO HAVE A LARGER NUMBER OF SMALLER MISSILES.

4. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSEN, A-454) SAID SOME MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION THOUGHT THAT THE U. S. NOV. 6 STATEMENT INDICATED A CHANGE IN THE U. S. POSITION ON THROW-WEIGHT, E. G., THE U. S. NOW BELIEVES THAT THROW-WEIGHT IS "THE" MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WITH REGARD TO ICBMS. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE U. S. POSITION: ICBM THROW-WEIGHT IS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FACTOR AND THAT THE U. S. HAD MADE THIS POINT THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. KLOSSON POINTED OUT THAT THE U. S. NOV. 6 STATEMENT HAD BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE THROW-WEIGHT IN A NON-PARTISAN AND OBJECTIVE MANNER AND THAT ANY OMISSION OF OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON ICBM THROW-WEIGHT IN THAT STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS INDICATING A CHANGE IN THE U. S. POSITION.

5. AT SOVIET NOV. 7 RECEPTION, BELETSKY, IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION (A-452), SAID THE SOVIET POSITION CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FBSS AND THAT THE ONLY CONDITION UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONSIDER LIMITING THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF LIMITING THE AGGREGATE TOTAL OF PAYLOADS CARRIED BY ICBMS, SLBMs, AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS, INCLUDING THE PAYLOAD OF B-52S WHICH U. S. HAS IN RESERVE OR MOTHBALLED. WHILE BELETSKY SAID IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE SUCH AN OVERALL AGGREGATE PAYLOAD LIMITATION, HE SAID THAT IT COULD BE DONE AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DONE SOME WORK ON THIS. BELETSKY ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS THE PAYLOAD OF THE F-4, WHOSE FLIGHT TIME CAN BE AS LITTLE AS 15-20 MINUTES, TO BE COMPARABLE TO THAT OF SOME MISSILES.

6. BELETSKY (TO FITZGERALD, A-452) ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS
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IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYBODY TO ARGUE THAT MOTHBALLED EQUIPMENT OR EQUIPMENT IN RESERVE CANNOT BE MADE OPERATIONAL WITHIN A FEW DAYS IN AN EMERGENCY OR WARTIME SITUATION. THE SOVIET UNION HAD HAD TO DO THIS ON A BROAD SCALE IN 1941. HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO REASON FOR NOT INCLUDING MOTHBALLED B-52S IN ANY AGREEMENT,

ADDING THAT QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FOR SUCH AIRCRAFT ARE READILY AVAILABLE, AT LEAST IN THE SOVIET CASE.

7. EQUALITY. SMOLIN (TO EARLE, A-453) NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD IN TWO PLACES IN 'TOODAY' STATEMENT EMPHASIZED THE APPEARANCE AS WELL AS THE FACT OF EQUALITY. WHEN SMOLIN ASKED IF HE SHOULD READ ANY SIGNIFICANCE INTO THIS EMPHASIS, EARLE POINTED OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH SALT WAS A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION,

IT WAS FOLLOWED WITH GREAT INTEREST BY ALL NATIONS, AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THEREFORE, EARLE CONTINUED, IT WAS NECESSARY THAT ALL THOSE INTERESTED SHOULD SEE CLEARLY THAT ANY PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT WOULD GIVE NEITHER SIDE A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

8. FBS. IN RESPONSE TO AUSLAND'S EXPRESSED HOPE (A-457) THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT ACTUALLY BELIEVE THAT THE U. S. WOULD AGREE TO SOVIET PROPOSALS TO WITHDRAW SO-CALLED FBS, CHULITSKY NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE INCLUDED IN THE MBFR TALKS. IN REPLY, AUSLAND SAID THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER MATTER AND THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO THE SALT CONTEXT.

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9. BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES. KLOSSON (TO GRINEVSKY, A-454) NOTED THAT SEMENOV HAD REFERRED TO BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES WITHOUT THE MODIFIER INTER-CONTINENTAL AND ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WAS INTRODUCING

A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. KLOSSON POINTED OUT THAT IF THE USSR WISHED TO HAVE ACCOUNT TAKEN OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH LESS THAN INTER-CONTINENTAL RANGE IN THIRD COUNTRIES, THEN IT SEEMED ONLY LOGICAL ALSO TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SOVIET MISSILES OF LESS THAN INTTER-CONTINENTAL RANGE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THESE THIRD COUNTRIES. GRINEVSKY DISAGREED, SAYING THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL HAD NOT SAID HOW OR IN WHAT FORM BALLISTIC MISSILES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD BE TAAKEN INTO ACCOOUNT; THEY SIMMPLY WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS PART OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION.

10. PERSONNEL CHANGE IN SOVIET DELEGATION. WITH BELETSKY'S PROMOTION TO COLONEL GENERAL, TRUSOV (TO ROWNY, A-455) INDICATED THAT HE (TRUSOV) WOULD NOT BE RETURNING TO THE SALLT DELEGATION. TRUSOVV DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION RE HIS FUTURE ASSIGNMENT WHICH IN ANY EVENT HAS APPARENTLY NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. (TRUSOV TOLD FITZGERALLD AT SOVIET NOV. 7 RECEPTION (A-451) THAT BELETSKY WOULD REPLACE HIM ON THE SOVIET SALT DELEGATION. TRUSOV ALSO SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE
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NO OTHER MILITARY DELEGATE SINCE THE SOVIET SIDE FELT THAT ONE GENERAL OFFICER REPRESENTING THE GENERAL STAFF WAS ADEQUATE.

11. MIRVS. SHELEPIN (TO IFFT, A-450) AT SOVIET NOV. 7 RRECEPTION SAID THE SOVIET SIDE IS COMPLETELY SERIOUS IN ITS DESIRE TO LIMIT MIRVS, ADDING THAT THE NEXT STEP IS FOR THE U.S. TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLLE TO LIMIT MIRVS ON ICBMS AND SLBMS. IN RESPONSE TO IFFT'S OBJECTION RE LACK OF INFORMAATION OF WHAT SOVIETS HAD IN MIND AND HIS QUESTIONS ON ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, SHELEPIN SAID THERE WWAS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING DETAILS IF U.S. REFUSESS TO LIMIT SLBM MIRVS. SHELEPIN SAID THAT IT WAS CCORRECT THAT IF THE U.S. REFUSED TO LIMIT SLBM MIRVS, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD REFUSE TO LIMIT ICBM MIRVS.

12. SHELEPIN ALSO SAID (A-450) THAT PHRASE "AGREED PORTION" COULD REFER TO NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS OR PROPORTIONS OF THE FORCES WHICH WOULD BE WORKED OUT AFTER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. WHEN ASKED IF SOVIET SIDE ENVISIONED MIRVS ON ITS HEAVY ICBMS, SHELEPIN REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION WAS ALSO INTENDED TO BE NNEGOTIATED IN THE PHRASE "AGREED PORTION". SHELEPIN SAID THE SIDES SHOULD PROCEED TO DISCUSS THESEE DETAILED QUESTIONS, BUT STRESSED THAT THIS WOULD BE USELESS IF THHE U.S. REFUSED TO LIMIT SLBM MIRVS. SHELEPIN ALSO SAID THAT IT NO LONGER MAADE SENSE TO CONSIDER A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT AT THE END OF 1973 WHEN WE WERE COMMITTED TO CONCLUDING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT IN 1974. WITH RESPECT TO MIRV LIMITATIONS IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, HE SAID THE U.S. HAS HAD ALMOST NOTHING TO SAY.

13. MOBILE ICBMS. AT SOVIET NOV. 7 RECEPTION, FITZGERALD (A-452) ASKED BELETSKY WHY SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE II REFERRED TO ALL TYPES OF LAND-BASED ICBMS, WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO INCLUDE MOBILE LAUNCHERS, WHILE SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE III REFERRED ONLY TO FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS. BELETSKY SAID THE QUESTION OF MOBILE LAUNCHERS WAS A "DETAIL" AND THAT THE BEST WAY TO DISCUSS SUCH DETAILS WAS FOR THE U.S. SIDE TO MAKE A PROPOSAL. BELETSKY SAID THE PRESENT WORDING OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT PROHIBIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-MOBILE ICBMS AND CONCLUDED THAT MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON BANNING THEM OR DEPLOYING THEM COULD BE REACHED. IF THEIR DEPLOYMENT WERE TO BE PERMITTED, BELETSKY SAID, THEY WOULD COUNT IN THE SECRET

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PERMITTED LEVEL OF LAND-BASED ICBMS.

14. IFFFT (A-450) AT NOV. 7 RECEPTION NOTED TOO SHELEPIN THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT TEXT DID NOT MENTION MOBILE ICBMS AND ASKED IF SOVIETS THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE NO CONSTRAINTS ON SUCH SYSTEMS. SHELEPIN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS SHOULD BE CONSTRAINED IN THE

AGREEMENT AND THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS MOBILE ICBMS IN THIS CONTEXT.

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